1995 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

12-26-1995

Health Mainten. Org. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Whitman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995

Recommended Citation
"Health Mainten. Org. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Whitman" (1995). 1995 Decisions. 318.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/318

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 1995 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 94-5698
___________
THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION OF NEW
JERSEY, INC., d/b/a HMO/NJ
Appellant,
vs.
CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, in her capacity as
Governor of the State of New Jersey;
ELIZABETH RANDALL, in her capacity as
Commissioner of the Department of Insurance
of the State of New Jersey; CHARLES
WOWKANECH, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Individual Health Coverage Program
Appellees.
___________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil No. 93-cv-05775)
___________
BEFORE:

ARGUED OCTOBER 11, 1995
GREENBERG, LEWIS and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed December 26, 1995)
___________

Alan J. Davis (ARGUED)
Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll
1735 Market Street
51st Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Attorney for Appellant

1

Michael E. Goldman (ARGUED)
Office of Attorney General of New Jersey
Department of Law & Public Safety
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex
Trenton, NJ 08625
Attorney for Appellees
Frank W. Hunger
Assistant Attorney General
Faith S. Hochberg
United States Attorney
Anthony J. Steinmeyer
Jeffrey Clair
United States Department of Justice
Appellate Civil Division, Room 3617
Washington, DC 20530-0001
Attorneys for United States as Amicus Curiae
B. John Pendleton, Jr.
McCarter & English
100 Mulberry street
Four Gateway Center
Newark, NJ 07101-0652
Attorney for Blue Cross and Blue Shield
New Jersey as Amicus Curiae
___________
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge.
This appeal requires us to address the delicate balance
between federal and state authority established under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.

The Health

Maintenance Organization of New Jersey ("HMO/NJ") appeals from
the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants
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Christine Todd Whitman, the Governor of New Jersey, Elizabeth
Randall, the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Insurance, and Charles Wowkanech, the Chairman of the New Jersey
Individual Health Coverage Program (collectively, "the State").
The sole issue we address in this appeal is whether the Federal
Employee Health Benefits Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901, et. seq.
("FEHBA") preempts certain provisions of the New Jersey Health
Insurance Reform Act, N.J.S.A. §§ 17B:27A-2 - 27A-16.4 (the
"Reform Act").

HMO/NJ argues that the premium assessments under

the Reform Act are preempted by FEHBA because they will increase
the cost of individual health care benefits to federal employees,
benefits which are payable from the Federal Employee Health
Benefits Fund.

We agree.

For the reasons set forth below, we

hold that section 8909(f) of FEHBA preempts premium assessments
under the Reform Act when applied to insurance plans governed by
FEHBA, and will reverse the district court's order on the issue
of FEHBA preemption.
I.
A.
In response to this nation's growing health care
crisis, New Jersey enacted the Reform Act to ensure that all its
citizens would receive the benefits of individual health care
coverage.

(Individual health care coverage is coverage offered

by an insurance company or health maintenance organization
directly to an individual and his or her family.

By increasing

the availability of individual health care coverage, the State
intends to reduce the number of uninsured self-employed or
3

unemployed residents, who often do not have the option of
purchasing employer-based or group health coverage).
Under the Reform Act, a non-compensated, nine-member
Board of Directors "shall establish the policy and contract forms
and benefit levels to be made available" under an Individual
Health Coverage Program.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:27A-7.

In 1993,

the Board of Directors devised a program whereby state residents
would be offered five standardized individual health plans.1

The

program requires New Jersey health insurance companies and health
maintenance organizations (collectively referred to in the Reform
Act as "carriers") to offer state residents the five standardized
policies as a condition of continuing to issue any type of health
benefit plans in the state.
17B:27A-(a)(3)(c).

See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17B:27A-4,

Carriers were required to start offering the

five plans on August 1, 1993.
The central component of the Reform Act is the
requirement that all carriers in the state pay an "assessment"
1

The five standardized plans are intended to offer residents
a range of coverage with varying co-payment levels and a choice
of deductibles. These plans are guaranteed, which ensures that
an eligible applicant (in general, one is eligible for a
standardized plan if unable to procure group coverage, Medicare,
or Medicaid) will not be denied coverage. See N.J. Stat. Ann.
§17B:27A-6(a). The plans are also "community rated," so that a
carrier must offer a standard plan to everyone at the same rate
regardless of the applicant's age, gender, profession, health
status, or place of residency within the state. See id. If an
uninsured resident applies for one of the standard plans, and
that applicant has a pre-existing health condition, the carrier
is allowed to deny coverage for the preexisting condition for one
year, but thereafter must cover all conditions. N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 17B:27A-7(b). With the goal of making the individual policy
market a competitive one, the State does not regulate the rates
charged by carriers for the five plans.
4

that is used to defray financial losses incurred by those
companies that provide a disproportionate share of the "higherrisk" individual health insurance coverage in the state.

In

group health plans, the cost of insuring higher-risk people,
individuals who require expensive medical treatment, is spread
among the entire insured population.

In contrast, when people

are individually insured, these costs must be borne by either the
individual or the insurance company.

As a result, insurance sold

on an individual basis may be prohibitively expensive for the
consumer and unprofitable for the insurance company.

Through the

assessment, the Reform Act attempts to spread the cost of
insuring higher-risk individuals among New Jersey's entire
insurance industry in order to reduce the cost to the individual
while increasing the profitability of insuring those individuals.
New Jersey carriers are required to "pay or play" with
respect to the individual health insurance market.

For each

carrier, the Board establishes a target goal of individual
policies, or more specifically "non-group" policies, that the
carrier must issue in a calendar year if it wishes to obtain an
exemption from the assessment.

In general, a carrier's target

number of non-group policies for the exemption is calculated
based on the carrier's proportion of the overall state-wide
health coverage market.

See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:27A-12(d)(3).

The State pools the money collected pursuant to the
annual assessment and uses it to reimburse carriers who suffer
losses in the individual insurance market during the calendar
year.

The assessment is calculated as the proportion of the
5

carrier's "net earned premium" for the calendar year preceding
the assessment in relation to the net earned premium of all
carriers for the calendar year preceding the assessment.
Stat. Ann. § 17B:27A-12(a)(2).

N.J.

The Reform Act uses a carrier's

net earned premium as a proxy for the carrier's market share.

A

simplified example would be if a carrier earned 15% of all health
insurance premiums in New Jersey, then it would be assessed 15%
of the total losses incurred by carriers issuing individual
policies.

The "net earned premium" is all premiums earned in New

Jersey by a carrier on any of its health benefit plans, including
"the aggregate premiums earned on the carrier's insured group and
individual business and health maintenance organization
business[.]"

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:27A-2.

Notably, premiums

from self-insured plans administered by a carrier are not
included in the assessment calculation.

In addition, carriers

are assessed their proportion of the administrative expenses
incurred by the Individual Health Coverage Program.
§ 17B:17A-11(a).
B.
FEHBA provides health benefits for federal employees,
their families, and federal retirees.
seq.

See 5 U.S.C. § 8901 et

The program is administered by the Office of Personnel

Management ("OPM"), which is authorized to negotiate contracts
with qualified carriers for the provision of health benefits to
federal employees and other enrollees.

Premiums for enrollment

in a health plan are set annually and determined in OPM's
contract negotiations with each participating carrier.
6

The costs of enrolling in a health plan are paid by
contributions from the enrollee and the federal government.

The

government's share is equal to 60% of the average premium charged
by major participating health plans and may not exceed 75% of the
total charge for enrollment.

5 U.S.C. § 8906.

The balance of

the enrollment charge is paid by the enrollee and withheld from
the enrollee's salary or retirement annuity.

These contributions

are then paid into a specifically-designated account in the
United States Treasury:
"Fund").

the Employee Health Benefits Fund (the

5 U.S.C. § 8909.

Payments and reimbursements to

participating insurance carriers are then made from the Fund.
As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub.L. 101-508, Congress amended FEHBA by adding subsection
8909(f) which provides that:
(1) No tax, fee, or other monetary payment
may be imposed, directly or indirectly, on a
carrier or an underwriting or plan
administration subcontractor of an approved
[FEHBA] health benefits plan by any State
* * * or by any political subdivision or
other governmental authority thereof with
respect to any payment made from the Fund.
(2)

Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to

exempt any carrier underwriting or plan
administration subcontractor of an approved
health benefits plan from the imposition,
payment, or collection of a tax, fee, or
other monetary payment on the net income or
profit accruing to or realized by such
carrier or underwriting or plan

7

administration subcontractor from business
conducted under [FEHBA], if that tax, fee, or
payment is applicable to a broad range of
business activity.
5 U.S.C. 8909(f).
C.
HMO/NJ, a wholly owned subsidiary of U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., is a health maintenance organization licensed by New Jersey
to provide health care benefit plans to employers and individuals
in the state.

Specifically, HMO/NJ also has a contract with the

federal government to provide health care benefits to federal
employees and federal enrollees who select HMO/NJ as their
provider.

For the 1992 calendar year, HMO/NJ was assessed

$429,783 under the Reform Act's premium assessment program.

The

total 1992 assessment for all program members was $2,613,005.
HMO/NJ paid its assessment, and it did not receive a 1992
reimbursement under the assessment program.

In 1993, HMO/NJ paid

an assessment of $6.4 million, again without receiving a
reimbursement under the program.

Like other carriers, HMO/NJ

began to issue the five standardized plans on August 1, 1993.

In

1993 to qualify for an exemption from the assessment HMO/NJ's
target number of non-group policies was 10,000; as of
December 27, 1993, HMO/NJ had issued only 428 non-group member
policies.

In contrast, to compensate for losses on its

individual policies during that year, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
New Jersey received a 1993 program reimbursement of approximately
$54 million.
8

The Reform Act's assessment provision is at the heart
of HMO/NJ's preemption claim.

HMO/NJ claims that "as a result of

having to pay into the premium assessment program, without
receiving any of the proceeds therefrom, HMO/NJ has been forced
to include a provision in its rates to subscribers -- principally
private sector employee benefit plans and federal employee plans
-- to cover the cost of the premium assessment."
Brief p.12 (emphasis added).

See Appellant's

A direct result of the 1993

assessment has been that HMO/NJ increased the cost of health care
benefits to its subscribers by "about one percent."

As a result,

HMO/NJ argues that "[t]he assessment is . . . a state imposed
tax, fee or monetary payment on FEHBA plans.

Accordingly, it

falls within the realm of FEHBA preemption."

Id., p.16.

HMO/NJ filed a lawsuit in the federal district court
for the District of New Jersey asserting that the State's premium
assessment program is preempted by both the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") and by 5 U.S.C. § 8909(f) of FEHBA.
Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
held that neither federal statute preempted the relevant
provisions of the Reform Act.

(For the purposes of this appeal

our review is limited to the issue of FEHBA preemption).

The

court concluded that FEHBA did not preempt the State scheme
because the statute itself allows states to impose assessments
"applicable to a broad range of business activity," 5 U.S.C.
§ 8909(f)(2), and the New Jersey statute fell within this savings
provision because the state law "does not specifically target
FEHBA plans."

The Health Maintenance Organization of New Jersey
9

v. Christine Todd Whitman, No. 93-5775, slip op. at 8 (D. N.J.
Oct. 3, 1994).

This appeal followed.
II.

The district court had jurisdiction over this matter
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2
§ 1291.3

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

Our review of the district court's grant of summary

judgment is plenary, Public Interest Research of N.J. v. Powell
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1990); Wheeler
v. Towanda Area School Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 129 (3d Cir. 1991),
as is our review of all questions of law.

Epstein Family

Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).
III.
Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2,
federal law preempts state law "either by express provision, by
implication, or by a conflict between federal and state law." New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995).

In other

words, "[w]here a state statute conflicts with or frustrates
federal law, the former must give way."
Easterwood, 123 L.Ed.2d 387, 396 (1993).

CSX Transportation v.
In order to avoid an

unintended encroachment on state authority, the Supreme Court has
made clear that when interpreting a federal statute, courts

2

"The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
3
"The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
10

should be reluctant to find preemption.
115 S. Ct. at 1676.

Id. at 396; Travelers,

Instead, we begin with the presumption that

Congress does not intend to preempt state law.
Ct. at 1676.

Travelers, 115 S.

State law will only be preempted when it is the

"clear and manifest purpose of Congress."

CSX, 123 L.Ed.2d at

396 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)); Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1676; Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617-18 (1992); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 472 U.S. 724, 740 (1985).
To determine Congress' intent, we begin with the text
of the statute in question, and then move on to "the structure
and purpose of the Act in which it occurs."

Travelers, 115 S.

Ct. at 1677. As the Supreme Court has stated:
If the statute contains an express preemption clause, the task of statutory
construction must in the first instance focus
on the plain wording of the clause, which
necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress' preemptive intent.
CSX, 123 L.Ed.2d at 396.

If Congressional intent is unclear,

however, courts should defer to an implementing agency's
interpretation of the statute, as long as that interpretation is
reasonable.

See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("[I]f the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.").

With these

principles in mind, we conclude that Congress intended to preempt
state law in this instance.

11

A.
The plain language of subsection 8909(f)(1) of FEHBA
preempts the New Jersey Reform Act's premium assessment.

In

interpreting any statute, we begin with the plain language of the
statute itself.

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494

U.S. 827, 835 (1990); In re Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 345 (3d Cir.
1995) ("[W]e begin with the familiar canon that the starting
point for interpreting a statute is its plain language.") (citing
Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 588 (1989)); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Cityfed Financial Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1237 (3d Cir.
1995).

While the expression "plain language" may in certain

instances be an oxymoron, In re Segal, 57 F.3d at 346, unless
there is a clear expression of legislative intent to the
contrary, Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 835, "courts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says."

Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S.

Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992).
Title 5 of the United States Code, at section
8909(f)(1) provides that:
(1)

No tax, fee, or other monetary payment

may be imposed, directly or indirectly, on a
carrier or an underwriting or plan
administration subcontractor of an approved
[FEHBA] health benefits plan by any State
* * * or by any political subdivision or
other governmental authority thereof with
respect to any payment made from the Fund.
12

5 U.S.C. 8909(f).

Under section 8909(f)(1), state regulation is

preempted if it is (1) a state or local tax, fee, or other
monetary payment; (2) imposed directly or indirectly on a
carrier; and (3) with respect to payments made from the Employee
Health Benefits Fund.

See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d

708, 715 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a state surcharge on
hospital rates was preempted by both ERISA and FEHBA), reversed
on other grounds, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995)
(holding that ERISA did not preempt the state surcharge).
Although there is no dispute that the premium assessment
satisfies the second criteria, the state argues that the
assessment does not meet the first and third criteria.
The State argues that the Reform Act's premium
assessment is not preempted by section 8909(f)(1) for two
reasons.

First, the State argues that Congress only intended

FEHBA preemption to apply to "premium taxes," and that the
premium assessment cannot be considered a premium tax because it
is "apportioned on the basis of market share, not premiums."
(Appellees' Br. at 42) (emphasis in original).

(Premium taxes

are defined as those taxes "imposed on FEHB premiums by any State
. . ."

48 C.F.R. § 1652.216-71 (1992)).

The State's argument is

based on language in the statute's legislative history4 as well
4

H.R. No. 101-881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 173 reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2181 ("exempts the FEHB from state premium
taxes"); H.R. No. 101-881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 176 reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2184 ("This state premium tax exemption is
intended to be similar in nature and application to the existing
premium tax exemptions applicable to the Employee's Life
13

as its title in section 7002(c) of OBRA ("EXEMPTION FROM STATE
PREMIUM TAXES").

Second, the State argues that even if the

assessment falls within section 8909(f)(1)'s definition of "tax,
fee, or other monetary payments," it is not made "with respect to
any payment from the fund."

(Appellees' Br. at 42-43). According

to the State, the premium assessment simply represents a general
cost of doing business.

The fact that this cost is passed on to

FEHBA enrollees is a purely voluntary decision made by the
carrier.

Neither the Reform Act nor its implementing regulations

mandate such a result.

In presenting these arguments, the State

argues that we must reject the Second Circuit's reasoning in
Travelers.
We find these arguments unpersuasive.

By its terms,

section 8909(f)(1) prohibits the imposition of taxes, fees, or
other monetary payments.

The plain language of the statute is

therefore not limited to "premium taxes," and the assessment
clearly falls within the definition of a "fee" or "other monetary
payment."

As a result, the only genuine question is whether the

premium assessment program is imposed "with respect to any
payment from the Fund."

Contrary to the State's position, OPM's

interpretation of the statute and the statute's general
legislative history support a broad interpretation of the
statute's third criterion.

Because the Second Circuit addressed

Insurance Fund, as set forth in section 8714 of title 5, United
States Code."); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2184, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2374, 2681 ("the
conference agreement includes the House and Senate provisions
. . . exempting the FEHBP from State premium taxes").
14

these very same issues and we agree with its reasoning in
Travelers, we will discuss the decision in greater detail.
In facts very similar to those before us, the Second
Circuit in Travelers concluded that FEHBA preempted several New
York hospital surcharges.

In its effort to contain health care

costs and guarantee the availability of hospital insurance
coverage to needy New Yorkers, New York enacted three hospital
surcharges.

New York Public Health Law § 2807-c(1)(b) required

insurance carriers other than Blue Cross & Blue Shield, an HMO,
or a government insurance such as Medicaid, to pay a 13%
surcharge directly to the hospital.

New York Public Health Law

§ 2807-c(11)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1993) required an additional 11%
surcharge charged to patients covered by commercial insurance,
and New York Public Health Law § 2807-c(2-a)(a) (McKinney Supp.
1993) required an assessment of up to 9% on HMOs which failed to
enroll a target number of Medicaid-eligible persons.

The

proceeds from the 11% and 9% surcharges were paid into a
statewide pool, and subsequently ended up in the State's general
fund.

Travelers, 14 F.3d at 712.

The court found that the

primary purpose of the 11% surcharge was to increase the cost of
commercial insurance thereby making Blue Cross & Blue Shield more
competitive, while the purpose of the 9% surcharge was to
"encourage HMOs to enroll Medicaid recipients, thereby lowering
the costs of the Medicaid program."

Id.

Like the New Jersey

Reform Act's premium assessment, the overall purpose of these
surcharges was to spread the cost of insuring individuals who are
unable to obtain individual health care insurance.
15

The Second

Circuit found that the New York surcharges were preempted under
ERISA and FEHBA.

(The Supreme Court granted certiorari only on

the issue of ERISA preemption and reversed the Second Circuit in
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995)).
In addressing the issue of FEHBA preemption, the court
found that the plain language of section 8909(f)(1) preempted New
York's surcharges, and that this conclusion was consistent with
OPM's interpretation of the statute as well as the Act's overall
purpose of reducing government expenditures.

In Travelers, the

appellants, like the State in this action, argued that FEHBA
preemption was limited to "premium taxes."

In rejecting this

position, the court stated that "[t]o adopt the defendants'
crabbed view of preemption would undermine" the revenue-saving
purpose of section 8909(f)(1), FEHBA, and OBRA in general.
F.3d at 716.

14

The court then concluded that "[b]ecause payments

from the Fund are directly affected by what the hospitals charge
for their services, and because the surcharges increase the
amounts carriers draw from the Fund, the surcharges are clearly
imposed `with respect to . . . payment[s] made from the Fund.'"
Id.

We agree.
As mentioned earlier, the plain language of section

8909(f)(1) prohibits the imposition of taxes, fees, or other
monetary payments.

Section 8909(f)(1) clearly states that "[n]o

tax, fee, or other monetary payment may be imposed . . ."

The

language used in the statute makes no reference to "premium
taxes," and provides no indication that the statute is limited to
16

that particular form of tax.

Interpreting the plain language of

the statute, we conclude that Congress intended to preempt the
imposition of any tax, fee, or monetary payment on FEHBA carriers
with respect to payments from the Fund.
Even if we were to find that the statute's language is
ambiguous, based upon the statute's legislative history and
administrative regulations our conclusion would be the same.
Although the statute's legislative history does occasionally use
the term premium taxes, see supra note 4, the same legislative
history describes section 8909(f) as exempting FEHBA from "any
tax, fee, or other monetary payment . . ."

H.R. No. 101-881,

p.176, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 2184.

According to OPM,

the phrase "premium taxes" represents a shorthand reference to
the more cumbersome clause itself.
717.

See Travelers, 14 F.3d at

As a result, OPM interprets the statute as follows:

"[t]he

prohibited payments, referred to elsewhere in these regulations
as `premium taxes,' applies to all payments directed by States or
municipalities, regardless of how they may be titled, to whom
they must be paid, or the purpose for which they are collected
. . ."

48 C.F.R. § 1631.205-41 (emphasis added).

Given the

statute's plain language, OPM's interpretation of the statute is
reasonable and compels us to reject the State's narrow reading of
FEHBA's preemption provision.

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

See

also Louisiana Public Service Com. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69
(1986) ("[A] federal agency acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state
regulation."); Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La
17

Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982) (valid federal regulation
intended to displace state law has no less preemptive effect than
a federal statute); Freehold Cogeneration Associates v. Board of
Regulatory Comm'rs of the State of New Jersey, 44 F.3d 1178, 1190
(3d Cir. 1995) ("Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, a federal agency acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority has the power to preempt
state regulation and render unenforceable state or local laws
which are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law.").5
The interpretation of "with respect to any payment made
from the Fund" is a slightly harder question.

Neither the

statute or the legislative history defines this specific
criterion.

Once again, however, OPM's regulations provide us

with guidance.

According to OPM, section 8909(f)(1)'s

prohibition applies to "all forms of direct and indirect
measurements on FEHBP premiums, however modified . . ."
C.F.R. § 1631.205-41.

48

The court in Travelers understood this to

include any direct or indirect tax that resulted in increased
payments from the Fund.

14 F.3d at 716.

As discussed earlier,

FEHBA participants and the federal government contribute payments
to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund.

Carriers like

HMO/NJ who have a contract with the federal government to provide
health benefits coverage are paid for their services directly
from the Fund.

5 U.S.C. § 8909(a)(1) (premium contributions to

5

There is no dispute that OPM is vested with the authority
to administer, oversee, and promulgate regulations for the FEHBA
program. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8902, 8909(a) and 8913.
18

the Fund are available for all payments to approved health
benefits plans); 48 C.F.R. § 1632.170(a) ("OPM will pay to
carriers of community-rated plans the premium payments received
for the plan . . . .

Premium payments will be due and payable no

later than 30 days after receipt by the Federal Employees Health
Benefits (FEHB) Fund.").6

Given this payment scheme, the Reform

Act's premium assessment is imposed "with respect to any payment
made from the fund" because the amount OPM must pay to HMO/NJ is
based on HMO/NJ's premiums which have increased in part as a
result of the premium assessment.

Because payments from the fund

are directly affected by what HMO/NJ charges for its services,
and the premium assessment increases the amount OPM must pay from
the Fund, New Jersey's premium assessment are imposed "with
respect to . . . payment[s] made from the Fund."

Although this

may be characterized as an indirect imposition because the
increased payment is based upon HMO/NJ's voluntary decision to
pass the costs of the premium assessment along to FEHBA plans,
the plain language of FEHBA section 8909(f)(1) unequivocally

6

HMO/NJ's plans are community rated plans. "Community rate
means a rate of payment based on a per member per month
capitation rate or its equivalent that applies to a combination
of the subscriber groups for a comprehensive medical plan." 48
C.F.R. § 1602.1702(a). The plans addressed in Travelers were
experience-rated plans whose contribution rates "are based on the
plan's actual paid claims, administrative expenses, and other
allowable `retentions.'" 14 F.3d at 715-716 n.2 (citing 48
C.F.R. § 1602.170-6 (1992)). Although both types of plans
receive funds directly from the Fund, their methods of payment
are differ. Community rated plans have their premiums paid
directly from the Fund, 48 C.F.R. § 1632.170(a), while experience
rated plans must draw against letter-of-credit accounts on a
"checks presented" basis. 48 C.F.R. § 1632.170(b).
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preempts indirect as well as direct taxes, fees, or other
monetary payments, 5 U.S.C. § 8909(f)(1) ("No tax, fee, or other
monetary payment may be imposed, directly or indirectly . . .")
(emphasis added).
Our interpretation of FEHBA section 8909(f)(1) is
consistent with the Act's overall purpose.

The general purpose

of the FEHBA program is to:
protect federal employees against the high
and unpredictable costs of medical care and
to assure that federal employee health
benefits are equivalent to those available in
the private sector so that the federal
government can compete in the recruitment and
retention of competent personnel.
National Federation of Federal Employees v. Devine, 679 F.2d 907,
913 n.9 (D.C.Cir. 1982) (quoting AFGE v. Devine, 525 F. Supp.
250, 252 (D. D.C. 1981)).

FEHBA section 8909(f) was enacted in

1990 to achieve budgetary savings without sacrificing the quality
of health care protection provided by FEHBA or impairing the
government's ability to attract and retain talented personnel.
See H.R. No. 101-881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 173, 181 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2181, 2190.

It was passed in

response to a U.S. General Accounting Office report indicating
that the government could cut costs by exempting FEHBA carriers
from state taxes.

See United States General Accounting Office,

Federal Compensation:

Premium Taxes Paid by the Health Benefits

Program, GAO/GGD 29-102 (August 8, 1989) (Joint Appendix at 530).
According to the legislative history, the savings presumably
would "result from reduced program costs which in turn reduce the
employer premiums the Government pays."
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H.R. No. 101-881, 101st

Cong., 2d Sess. 190 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2198.
The New Jersey assessment, which increases the cost of providing
health care to the federal government and its employees,
frustrates these congressional objectives.

Based upon the plain

language of the FEHBA preemption statute, OPM's implementing
regulation, and the federal policies and objectives underlying
the statute's enactment, we conclude that the New Jersey Reform
Act's assessment scheme is preempted by FEHBA section 8909(f)(1).
Having reached this conclusion, we now address whether the scheme
is nonetheless "saved" by FEHBA section 8909(f)(2).
B.
FEHBA section 8909(f) is best understood as Congress'
effort to exempt FEHBA plans from certain generally applicable
laws.

We must interpret section 8909(f)(2) in order to determine

the scope of that exemption.

FEHBA section 8909(f)(2) provides:

Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to
exempt any carrier underwriting or plan
administration subcontractor of an approved
health benefits plan from the imposition,
payment, or collection of a tax, fee, or
other monetary payment on the net income or
profit accruing to or realized by such
carrier or underwriting or plan
administration subcontractor from business
conducted under [FEHBA], if that tax, fee, or
payment is applicable to a broad range of
business activity.
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5 U.S.C. 8909(f)(2) (emphasis added).

In other words, a tax,

fee, or other monetary payment that would otherwise be preempted
under subsection 8909(f)(1) is "saved" if it is "applicable to a
broad range of business activity."

In upholding the New Jersey

scheme, the district court concluded that the premium assessment
was applicable to a broad range of business activity.

The court

reasoned that "for FEHBA plans to be exempt from state-imposed
premium taxes, the state tax must be specifically levied against
the FEHBA plan."

The Health Maintenance Organization of New

Jersey v. Christine Todd Whitman, No. 93-5775, slip op. at 8 (D.
N.J. Oct. 3, 1994).

We disagree.

The plain language of the statute requires a more
expansive exemption for FEHBA plans.

According to section

8909(f)(2), states are preempted from imposing any tax, fee, or
other monetary payment on carriers of FEHBA plans except those
taxes, fees, or other monetary payments that are "applicable to a
broad range of business activity."

By definition, "broad range"

is synonymous with "wide range" or "extensive" business
activities.

See The Random House College Dictionary 171 (Rev.

ed. 1982); Webster's New World Dictionary 176 (3d ed 1988)
(broad:

"wide in range; not limited").

If Congress had intended

only to preempt taxes specifically targeting FEHBA plans, it
would have said so expressly.

Instead, the statute's language

reflects an intent to exempt FEHBA plans from all taxes and fees
except those generally applicable to other commercial industries.
In addition to the plain language of the statute, our
interpretation is justified by the statute's underlying purpose.
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As discussed earlier, FEHBA section 8909(f) was enacted as a cost
saving measure.

If we were to accept the district court's

interpretation of subsection 8909(f)(2), it would render all of
section 8909(f) superfluous.

The Constitution itself prohibits

states from specifically targeting the Federal Government and
Federal programs.

Under the Supremacy Clause, "state taxes on

contractors are constitutionally invalid if they discriminate
against the Federal Government, or substantially interfere with
its activities."
n.11 (1982).

United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735,

A statute preempting such action is therefore

unnecessary, and if subsection 8909(f)(2) was intended to preempt
only state taxes specifically targeting FEHBA plans, FEHBA
section 8909(f) as a whole would not save the Federal Government
any money because those taxes are already prohibited by the
Constitution.
The district court's narrow interpretation would also
undermine one of the statute's specific objectives - exempting
FEHBA plans from state premium taxes.

As the State has

consistently argued, FEHBA section 8909(f)(1) was enacted to
exempt FEHBA plans from state premium taxes.

(As we discussed

earlier, section 8909(f) exempts other taxes, fees, and monetary
payments as well).

Because premium taxes do not specifically

target FEHBA plans, under the district court's interpretation,
they would be saved from preemption by section 8909(f)(2).

This

result is clearly inconsistent with one of the statute's
principal goals, and must be rejected.

The goal of preempting

state premium taxes also guides our interpretation of what
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Congress considered "a broad range of business activity." Because
premium taxes are applicable to the entire insurance industry, it
would appear that a tax, fee, or other monetary payment is
imposed on "a broad range of business activity" when, at the very
least, it applies to more than a single industry.

A less

inclusive definition, like the one adopted by the district court,
would permit states to impose a tax that Congress specifically
meant to preempt.

Given Congress' objective, a tax applicable to

only a single industry like insurance, banking, or real estate,
cannot be treated as applying to a broad range of business
activity.

At the very least, the tax must apply to more than a

single industry or business activity.
The New Jersey Reform Act's premium assessment scheme
is not imposed on "a broad range of business activity."

Unlike a

state premium tax, the Reform Act's premium assessment is not
even imposed on the insurance industry as a whole.

The

assessment "applies only to the health insurance business and,
even within that limited field, carves out a list of health
insurance activities that are not subject to the statutory levy."
(United States as Amicus Curiae, Br. at 16).

The New Jersey

statutory scheme excludes certain accident policies, Medicare
coverage, and other types of insurance plans that offer health
benefits.

See N.J.S.A. § 17B:27-A-2.

As such, the premium

assessment is imposed on a rather limited range of business
activity, and is not saved by subsection 8909(f)(2). Accordingly,
the Reform Act's premium assessment scheme is preempted as
applied to FEHBA plans.

We hasten to add, however, that we hold
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only that FEHBA preempts New Jersey's premium assessment scheme
as applied to FEHBA plans.

We do not hold that the Reform Act's

assessment provisions are preempted or inapplicable to all of the
insurance activities of carriers like HMO/NJ.
IV.
Although we hold that FEHBA preempts the New Jersey
Reform Act's premium assessment program as applied to FEHBA
plans, we are compelled to note that we are somewhat troubled
that our ruling today impedes the State's legitimate effort to
reform the existing health care system and provide needed health
care coverage to all its citizens.

We are mindful that Congress'

failure to reform the provision of health care at the national
level has increased the need for a state by state resolution of
this problem.

Until Congress amends FEHBA, however, our decision

is dictated by the plain language of the statute, its legislative
history, and the Act's overall purpose.

We cannot grant the

states authority which Congress, in a legitimate exercise of its
authority, specifically denied.

Accordingly, the district

court's order with respect to FEHBA preemption will be reversed.
In view of our conclusions, the district court's order
with respect to FEHBA preemption will be reversed.

We will

remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings
to fashion a remedy.

In this regard we note that in its amicus

curiae brief the United States suggests a method to implement a
holding that the Reform Act is preempted with respect to FEHBA
policies.

On the remand the district court should consider this
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proposal as well as any other suggestions the parties may make to
give effect to this opinion.
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